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BACKGROUND 
On or about May 29, 1993, Dr. Jerald G. Seare ("Dr. Seare") 
file an appeal from the judgment and order of the District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable F. 
Dennis Frederick presiding. On or about August 5, 1993, the 
defendants filed a responsive brief. The Court heard oral 
argument on Dr. Seare's appeal and issued an opinion affirming 
the decision of the trial court below on or about September 15, 
1994. 
ARGUMENT 
Dr. Seare petitions this Court, pursuant to Rule 35 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate procedure, for rehearing of his appeal 
from the judgment and order of the Third Judicial District Court. 
This Court issued its opinion on Dr. Seare's appeal on September 
15, 1994. Dr. Seare's Petition for Rehearing is based on several 
points of fact and law which have been overlooked and/or 
misapprehended by the Court. 
Dr. Seare contends that the Court erred in affirming the 
decision of the court below granting summary judgment in favor of 
appellees/defendants. There are several key, material facts 
which are in genuine dispute. Moreover, as a matter of law the 
appellees/defendants were not entitled to judgment in the court 
below nor were they entitled to an affirmance of that judgment by 
the Court. The record on appeal as well as the opinion of this 
Court corroborate Dr. Seare's contentions. 
-1-
I. THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED UTAH LAW REGARDING AMBIGUOUS 
CONTRACTS WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE CONTRACT TERMS WERE 
AMBIGUOUS AND THEN PROCEEDED TO CONSIDER EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE. 
On page six (6) of the its opinion, the Court states 
We conclude that this language [as to "appropriate 
certificate" and "satisfactory completion"] is ambiguous and 
therefore look to other language in the contract to 
determine the intent of the parties. ... Because the 
contract is ambiguous, we further determine the University's 
obligations by looking to extrinsic evidence submitted to 
the trial court. 
Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals dated September 15, 1994 at 
page 6. In Utah, summary judgment is inappropriate when the 
intent of the parties cannot be determined as a result of an 
ambiguous contract. 
In interpreting a contract, it is a well settled rule that 
the court looks initially to the four corners of the document to 
determine the intent of the parties. HCA Health Service of Utah, 
Inc. v. St. Mark's Charities, 846 P.2d 476, 484 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993); Anesthesiologists Associates of Ogden v. St. Benedicts 
Hospital, 852 P.2d 1030 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Moreover, because 
in the instant case there are several contracts executed between 
the parties which are clearly interrelated, the contracts "must 
be construed as a whole and harmonized, if possible." HCA Health 
Service of Utah, Inc. v. St. Mark's Charities, 846 P.2d at 484 
(citing Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (quoting Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 
229 (Utah 1987) (citation omitted))). 
While looking at the contract to determine the intent of the 
parties, the court must necessarily determine whether the intent 
-2-
of the parties is ambiguous. Whether the terms of the contract 
are ambiguous is a question of law. Anesthesiologists Associates 
of Ogden v. St. Benedicts Hospital, 852 P.2d at 1035; Sparrow v. 
Tayco Construction Co., 846 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
This question of law must be decided prior to the consideration 
of parol or other extrinsic evidence. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 
665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). Only if the court determines as 
a matter of law that the terms of the contract are ambiguous, can 
it consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the 
parties. Sparrow v. Tayco Construction Co., 846 P.2d 1323; Ron 
Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). 
It is evident from reading the opinion of the Court, that the 
intent of the parties was ambiguous. Such a determination was 
properly made by the Court. 
However, because of the ambiguity, it was inappropriate for 
the Court and the trial court below to consider extrinsic 
evidence. "If a contract is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence should 
be considered to determine the parties' intent, and x [qluestions 
of intent as determined by extrinsic evidence are questions of 
fact....'" Anesthesiologists Associates of Ogden v. St. 
Benedicts Hospital, 852 P.2d at 1035 (quoting Fitzgerald v. 
Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990)) (emphasis added). 
The Utah State Supreme Court has also spoken on this issue: 
[T]he court should first examine the language of the 
instruments and accord to it the weight and effect which it 
may show was intended and if the meaning is ambiguous or 
uncertain then consider parol evidence of the parties 
intentions. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d at 1293 
(guotingr Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P. 2d 690, 691 
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(Utah 1977)). Of course, a motion for summary judgment may 
not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an 
ambiguity exists in the contract and there is a factual 
issue as to what the parties intended. Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d at 1293 (citing Grow v. Marwick 
Development, Inc., 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1980)) (emphasis 
added). 
See also Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991) 
("A motion for summary judgement may not be granted if a legal 
conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists and there is a 
factual issue as to what the parties intended." (citation 
omitted)). 
Based on the clear and well established legal precedent, the 
Court either misapprehended or overlooked Utah law and committed 
error warranting rehearing when it made a legal conclusion that 
the contract was ambiguous and then went on the consider 
extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties. 
Moreover, what the parties intended is strongly contested and is 
therefore a genuine issue of material fact. Even more telling is 
the recognition of the Court given to the disputed facts 
regarding the intent of the parties. 
The Court contrasts the conflicting evidence of Dr. 
McGreevy's and Dr. Seare. There is direct conflict in the 
Court's discussion. The Court chose to credit Dr. McGreevy's 
evidence and to disbelieve Dr. Seare's evidence. Judging the 
credibility, veracity, and character of a witness is not within 
the province of an appeals court. Such a function lies within 
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the province of the fact finder.1 
Dr. Seare's Petition for Rehearing must be granted. Utah 
law is well settled: whether a contract is ambiguous is a 
question of law. If the legal conclusion is drawn that a 
contract is ambiguous, then the Court must necessarily consider 
parol or extrinsic evidence. Such evidence presents a question 
of fact, and in the procedural posture of a summary judgment 
motion the court committed error by considering extrinsic 
evidence. 
II. THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE LAW AND/OR OVERLOOKED THE 
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF 
CONTRACT(S) BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
The Court failed to address the contract and/or contracts 
that existed between the parties. Initially, on page five (5) of 
its opinion, the Court simply states "[r]egardless of the nature 
of the 3 + 3 program, we agree with the trial court that it was 
abrogated by the parties' subsequent action." Opinion of the 
1
 As to Dr. Seare, the Court notes that there is nothing in 
the record to substantiate the expectations of Dr. Seare. 
Whether Dr. Seare's expectations are reasonable is a question of 
fact and not of law. In the present case, such a determination 
cannot rightfully be made by an appellate court. Moreover, 
11 x
 [c] ontracts are to be construed in light of the reasonable 
expectations of the parties as evidenced by the purpose and 
language of the contract.'" HCA Health Services of Utah, Inc. v. 
St. Mark's Charities, 846 P.2d at 481 (quoting Nixon and Nixon, 
Inc. v. John New & Associates, 641 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982)). 
If the contract is ambiguous as determined by the Court, then of 
course, it is difficult to substantiate the expectations of the 
parties. However, Dr. Seare submitted an affidavit explaining 
his understanding, intent and expectations. The court has 
misapprehended its role by finding substantiation in Dr. 
McGreevy's position and determining that no substantiation exists 
for Dr. Seare's position. This is untenable as any such 
determination should be made by a finder of fact and not an 
appellate court. 
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Utah Court of Appeals dated September 15, 1994 at page 5. The 
Court further discusses the "University's intent at this point 
...." However, the Court does not address the intent of the 
parties nor the intent of Dr. Seare. 
Based on the opinion of the Court, it appears from its 
opinion that the Court assumed that the 3 + 3 contract did in 
fact exist. If that is the case, any modification of the 
contract must have been consented to by the parties to the 
contract. Dr. Seare never intended nor consented to any 
modification of his 3 + 3 contract with the defendants. 
Moreover, merely because the Court posits what the intent of the 
University was, such a determination does not reflect the intent 
of Dr. Seare, a party to the 3 + 3 contract. This is a question 
of fact, not law, which should be determined by a fact finder. 
Also, the Court fails to discuss whether there was a 
contract or contracts between the parties. The Court glosses 
over this issue artfully by stating that it agrees with the trial 
court below. However, such a gloss is inappropriate. There are 
no findings regarding the nature of the contractual relationship 
between the parties. Are they governed by a block contract such 
as the 3 + 3 contract or the 5 + 2 contract? Or are the parties 
governed by yearly contracts such as the house officer contracts 
entered into every year between the parties? Or are the parties 
governed by both a block contract and the yearly contracts? This 
is a disputed question of fact, based upon the intent of the 
parties. Moreover, the terms of the various contracts and 
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whether there was a breach of the various contracts by any of the 
parties is a disputed question of material fact. Any conclusions 
based on the assumptions of the Court in this regard are 
inappropriate without the benefit of specific findings. The 
Court failed to enunciate what the contract was that existed 
between the parties. But, how could it do so when such a 
determination is a question of disputed material fact? Thus, Dr. 
Seare's Petition for Rehearing should be granted as it would 
allow the Court to more carefully consider the contractual 
relationship between the parties. 
III. BECAUSE THE COURT ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS DISCUSSES THE 
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND THEN CREDITS THE TESTIMONY 
OF SOME WITNESSES AND NOT OTHERS, THE COURT HAS ACTED 
IN A FACT FINDING MANNER AND HAS MISAPPREHENDED ITS 
FUNCTION AS A REVIEWING COURT. 
The Court's opinion is replete with instances where it 
discusses the disputed material facts and then credits the 
testimony of one witness, Dr. McGreevy, and disbelieves the 
testimony of another witness, Dr. Seare. In other instances, the 
Court overlooks certain facts and misstates certain facts, 
disputed or not. 
First, on page three (3) of the Court's opinion, the Court 
finds that "[a]lthough the University was prepared to certify 
Seare to sit for the board exam to allow him to enter into a 
plastic surgery residency, it refused to certify him to sit for 
the board exam given his stated intention to practice medicine as 
a general surgeon." The facts show that there was no 
determination on the certification of Dr. Seare. The University 
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and Dr. McGreevy refused to certify Dr. Seare for anything at 
all, including general surgery. The only time a possibility of 
certification, limited in scope or not, was discussed was in the 
context of settlement negotiations between the parties. Thus, 
the conclusion by the Court as to this fact is simply not true. 
Second, while it is true that the University argued that Dr. 
Seare did not have the necessary experience for certification as 
corroborated by several of the physicians with whom Dr. Seare 
worked, several other physicians, also acting in response to Dr. 
McGreevy's inquiry found and determined that Dr. Seare was 
qualified for general surgery certification. See Exhibit 15 
attached to the defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment presented to the trial 
court. 
The statements and letters of the responding physicians 
present a genuine issue of material fact on two fronts. 
Initially, was the fifth year provided to and completed by Dr. 
Seare standard or substandard? The evidence on this issue 
presents a genuine issue of material fact. Despite the fact that 
Dr. McGreevy contends that Dr. Seare's fifth year was not 
standard and was by no means a "chief resident" year, Dr. Seare 
contends otherwise. Moreover, this disputed fact is exemplified 
by the letters from the physicians responding to Dr. McGreevy's 
inquiry.2 In addition, there is a genuine issue of material 
2
 For example, Dr. Lawrence E. Stevens, M.D., explains that 
he expected Dr. Seare to proceed into a plastic surgery residency 
and that Dr. Seare was qualified to do this, but that Dr. Seare 
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fact as to whether and why Dr. Seare's fifth year was 
substantively different from the fifth year of other general 
surgery residents. Whether Dr. Seare's performance was deficient 
is also a disputed question of fact. 
Third, the court overlooks the nature of the general surgery 
boards. There is only one certification for the general surgery 
boards. Regardless of what the resident chooses to do after 
general surgery training whether it be general surgery, plastic 
surgery, orthopedic surgery, etc., that resident must be 
certified as eligible to sit for the general surgery 
certification. The certification is NOT different depending on 
the residents choice of practice area. All residents at the time 
of their certification should be able to sit for the general 
surgery boards with the knowledge, skill and guidance they have 
acquired in their training to that point. The facts before the 
trial court, and consequently before the Court, illustrate the 
common understanding of the parties that the ultimate goal and 
would need more training before going into general surgery. Dr. 
Kent F. Richards, M.D. finds that Dr. Seare is qualified to go 
into general surgery after his fifth year. Whether Dr. Seare's 
fifth year was a standard chief resident year as he was told it 
was by Dr. McGreevy (this too is disputed) or was not is also 
supported by disputed facts in the record. Dr. Richard R. Price, 
M.D. comments that Dr. Seare should have the opportunity to 
"perform in a true chief resident situation...." Dr. C. David 
Richards, M.D. and Dr. Sherman C. Smith, M.D. both make reference 
to Dr. Seare's chief resident year at L.D.S. Hospital. Exhibit 
15 attached to Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 6, 1992. 
Because there is factual dispute as to the nature of Dr. Seare's 
fifth year of residency summary judgment at the trial court below 
was inappropriate. Moreover, an affirmance of the trial court's 
decision wherein there is a genuine issue of material fact is 
also inappropriate. 
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purpose of completing a five year residency program, whether for 
a general surgery or plastic surgery residency, was to prepare 
Dr. Seare for eligibility to test for certification in general 
surgery. Regardless of Dr. Seare's change of heart during his 
fifth year, he should have been eligible to sit for the general 
surgery boards. Whether 
Dr. Seare was properly prepared, as a result of Dr. McGreevy's 
alleged willy-nilly structuring of the fifth year, to sit for the 
general surgery boards is a genuine issue of material fact which 
was overlooked by the Court. 
Moreover, the Court seemed to overlook the fact, based on 
the single general surgery board certification, that there is no 
difference in the status of being "board eligible" at the end of 
the fifth year of training between those who have chosen to seek 
further training and those who wish to work in general surgery 
only. 
Fourth, the Court seems to accept Dr. McGreevy's version of 
the facts that Dr. McGreevy structured Dr. Seare's fifth year 
differently from the fifth years of other residents. If this is 
the case, then there is a serious conflict of fact regarding Dr. 
McGreevy's decision to do so. Moreover, the reasonableness of 
Dr. McGreevy's refusal is also a disputed question of fact. The 
record reflects that another doctor, Dr. Chris Tsoi, M.D., was 
allowed to repeat his third year of residency two times. In 
addition, Dr. Tsoi did not have an authentic and bona-fide fifth 
year, yet Dr. McGreevy certified Dr. Tsoi to sit for the general 
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surgery boards. Such arbitrary decision making based on whatever 
reasons raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding Dr. 
McGreevy's and the University's standards. The Court seems to 
recognize this factual dispute: 
Given the tailor-made nature of Seare's training [which is a 
question of fact itself], the University was apparently only 
obligated to certify Seare for additional training in a 
plastic surgery residency if he satisfactorily completed the 
five-year resident program designed specifically for the 
purpose. 
Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals at page 8 (emphasis added). 
Finally, the Court is fully aware of the dispute as to the 
material facts. Throughout its opinion it discusses the 
conflicting positions, both of which are part of the record, of 
the parties. ("Seare on the other hand, .... "In contrast, Dr. 
McGreevy testified ....") Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals at 
page 3. By recognizing the conflicting testimony and disputed 
facts and then crediting certain testimony and facts, the Court 
has committed and error and Dr. Seare's Petition for Rehearing 
should be granted. Because there are material facts in dispute 
which the Court either overlooked or misapprehended, an 
affirmance of the trial court's judgment and order was error. 
IV. BECAUSE THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO 
THE EXPRESS COVENANTS OR PROMISES OF THE CONTRACT(S) 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AND BECAUSE THE COURT COMES TO THE 
LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
IS AMBIGUOUS, THE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLIED 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IS 
MISAPPREHENDED. 
Dr. Seare did not seek to create a contract via the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing where no contract 
existed. To the contrary, the evidence shows, as do the Court's 
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conclusions, that a contract did, in fact, exist, whatever that 
contract may be. lf[E]very contract is subject to an implied 
covenant of good faith, that implied covenant 'cannot be 
construed to establish new, independent rights or duties not 
agreed upon by the parties.'" Sanderson v. First Security 
Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 308 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted). 
Thus, whatever the terms of the contract were, which is a 
question of fact, the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing allows for relief when the promises and terms of the 
contract are executed or not in bad faith by one of the parties. 
Dr. Seare has maintained that the defendants have breached 
the contract by acting in bad faith. 
Generally, "a covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
inheres in most, if not all, contractual relationships." St. 
Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 
199-200 (Utah 1991). Under the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, each party to a contract impliedly promises 
not to "intentionally or purposely do anything which will 
destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the 
fruits of the contract." Id. at 199. A violation of this 
covenant gives rise to a claim for breach of contrsict. Id. 
at 200. Whether there has been a breach of contract is 
generally a "factual issue to be determined by [the* fact 
finder] after consideration of all attendant circumstances 
and evidence...." 
Western Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 380 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). The Court states that "[t]here were no express 
covenants or promises to train Seare to become a general surgeon 
or to automatically certify him to sit for the board exam." 
Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals at pages 8-9. This 
statement is contrary to the Court's legal conclusion that the 
contract was ambiguous, see supra. Moreover, the intent, 
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expectations, and understandings of the parties is a disputed 
issue of material fact. Thus, again the Court misapprehends the 
facts and the law and errors in concluding that the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not come into play 
under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, Dr. Seare 
respectfully requests that the Court grant his Petition for 
Rehearing. 
V. THE COURT HAS MISAPPREHENDED THE LAW AND OVERLOOKED THE 
NATURE OF DR. SEARE'S COMPLAINT IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS DETERMINATION OF DR. 
SEARE'S SECTION 1983 CLAIM. 
Dr. Seare is seeking prospective relief from the defendants 
via his claims for violation of his civil rights and specific 
performance. " [S]tate officials sued in official capacity for 
prospective relief are "persons" for purposes of Section 1983." 
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 
(1989). Dr. Seare is seeking to have Dr. McGreevy certify him to 
sit for the general surgery boards. This is prospective relief. 
If Dr. Seare cannot recover monetary damages pursuant to his 
Section 1983 claim then so be it. However, his claim for 
prospective relief, i.e. specific performance is allowed under 
Section 1983. It appears also from the Court's opinion that it 
believes that the State and its actors have retained immunity 
from civil rights actions against them. See Opinion of the Utah 
Court of Appeals at page 9. This issue has been addressed by the 
United States Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court held that sovereign and governmental 
immunity statutes of the individual states do not bar Section 
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1983 suits. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990); see also 
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
In Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, a high school student 
brought an action against the school board and three school 
officials. One argument presented by the school board in seeking 
a dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was that the Florida state 
waiver of sovereign immunity statute did not extend to claims 
based on Section 1983. See id. at 359. The District Court of 
Appeal dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeal also agreed 
with the school board, however, the Court of Appeal acknowledged 
the holding of Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) "that 
a state cannot immunize an official from liability for injuries 
compensable under federal law." Howlett, 496 U.S. at 3 60. 
After considering the decisions in the lower courts, the 
Howlett Court turned to its analysis. The Court expressed a 
concern that if such an immunity defense were available to 
prevent suit based on a violation of a federal right, "that a 
state court may be evading federal law and discriminating against 
federal causes of action." Id. at 366. The Court explained 
[f]ederal law is enforceable in state courts not because 
Congress has determined that federal courts would otherwise 
be burdened or that state courts might provide a more 
convenient forum--although both might well be true--but 
because the Constitution and the laws passed pursuetnt to it 
are as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state 
legislature. The Supremacy Clause makes those laws "the 
supreme 'Law of the Land,' and charges state courts with a 
coordinate responsibility to enforce that law according to 
their regular modes of procedure. 
Howlett, 496 U.S. at 367. 
In Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), at issue was 
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a state statute that purported to immunize public entities and 
public employees for any liability for parole release decisions. 
The Supreme Court held that the statute at issue was preempted by 
Section 1983 "even though the federal cause of action [was] being 
asserted in the state courts." Id. at 284. The Court further 
explained 
"Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is 
wrongful under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 or Section 1985(3) 
cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of the 
federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to 
have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee 
into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the 
Constitution insures that the proper construction may be 
enforced. See McLaughin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 290 (7th 
Cir. 1968) . The immunity claim raises a question of federal 
law.' Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (CA7 1973) 
cert, denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1973). 
Martinez, 444 U.S. at 284 n.8. "[A] state law that immunizes 
government conduct otherwise subject to suit under Section 1983 
is preempted, even where the federal civil rights litigation 
takes place in state court, because the application of the state 
immunity law would thwart the congressional remedy, which of 
course already provides certain immunities for state officials." 
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988) (citations omitted). 
Howlett, Martinez, and Felder, make it clear that a state 
law that immunizes government conduct from liability for 
violation of civil rights is not applicable to claims made under 
Section 1983. Thus, the Court has misapprehended the law and Dr. 
Seare's Petition for Rehearing must be granted. 
In addition, the Court overlooked the law and the facts 
regarding a constitutionally protectable interest of Dr. Seare. 
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Dr. Seare did have a constitutionally protected property interest 
in attending the University of Utah. Davis v. Regis College, 830 
P.2d 1098, 1100 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) ("[A] student's interest in 
attending a public university is a constitutionally protected 
property right."); Anderson v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 22 
Cal.App.3d 763, 770 (1972) ("Attendance at a publicly financed 
institution of higher education is to be regarded as a benefit 
somewhat analogous to that of public employment."); see also 
Conard v. Univ. of Washington, 814 P.2d 1242, 1245-6 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Because the law supports a finding that Dr. Seare does in 
fact have a constitutionally protected property interest in his 
education and future employment premised on receiving his benefit 
of the bargain, the Court misapprehended the law in concluding 
that Dr. Seare's Section 1983 claim is not permissible. 
Moreover, the law clearly states that state actors can be sued 
under Section 1983 for prospective relief. Thus, Dr. Seare 
respectfully requests that his Petition for Rehearing be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the appellant/plaintiff respectfully 
requests that the Court grant his Petition for Rehearing. 
DATED and respectfully submitted this 29th day of September, 
1994. 
L. ZANEUGJLL, P, 
L. Zarie Gill 
Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff 
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